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RÉSUMÉ 
 
 Ce papier teste les prédictions du modèle de Barro-Gordon en utilisant les 
données américaines sur l’inflation et le chômage. Pour ce faire, il construit un modèle 
de jeu théorique général avec des préférences asymétriques qui englobe le modèle de 
Barro-Gordon et une version du modèle de Cukierman qui sont des cas spéciaux. Les 
tests du rapports de vraisemblance indiquent que la restriction imposée par le modèle 
de Barro-Gordon est rejetée par les données, mais celle imposée par la version du 
modèle de Cukierman ne l’est pas. Les estimations sous la forme réduite sont 
cohérentes avec l’idée selon laquelle la Réserve fédérale accorde une plus grande 
importance aux déviations positives qu’aux déviations négatives du chômage par 
rapport au taux naturel espéré. 
 
Mots clés : préférences asymétriques, prudence, modèles de théories des jeux avec 
politique monétaire, ARCH 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper tests the predictions of the Barro-Gordon model using US data on 
inflation and unemployment. To that end, it constructs a general game-theoretical model 
with asymmetric preferences that nests the Barro-Gordon model and a version of 
Cukierman’s model as special cases. Likelihood Ratio tests indicate that the restriction 
imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is rejected by the data but the one imposed by the 
version of Cukierman’s model is not. Reduced-form estimates are consistent with the 
view that the Federal Reserve weights more heavily positive than negative 
unemployment deviations from the expected natural rate. 
 
Key words : asymmetric preferences, prudence, game-theoretical models of monetary 
policy, ARCH 
 
 
1 Introduction
In an important article in the Journal of Monetary Economics, Ireland (1999) examines
whether the time-inconsistency problem in Barro and Gordon (1983) can explain the behav-
ior of the US inflation rate. Although the data rejects the predictions on the short-run dy-
namics of inflation and unemployment, it upholds the prediction on the long-term dynamics
whereby these variables form a linear and positive cointegrating relation. An interpretation
of the time-inconsistency problem in Barro and Gordon is that the inflation bias arises be-
cause the central banker is too ambitious, in the sense that it targets a rate of unemployment
below the natural rate. This assumption has been challenged recently on both theoretical
and operational grounds. McCallum (1997) argues that since, in equilibrium, unemploy-
ment equals the natural rate but inflation is larger than optimal, the central banker would
eventually understand that the unemployment target is unobtainable and revise its goal.
Blinder (1998) suggests on the basis of institutional evidence, that central banks actually
target the expected natural rate of unemployment. However, relaxing this assumption in
the linear-quadratic framework of Barro and Gordon means that the inflation bias is zero
and the model cannot explain suboptimally high inflation rates as arising from the lack of a
commitment technology.
More recently, Cukierman (2000) constructs a model where the central banker has asym-
metric unemployment preferences. Preferences are asymmetric in that the loss is zero for
negative, but increases quadratically for positive, unemployment deviations from the target.
Cukierman shows that if the central banker is uncertain about the future realizations of infla-
tion and unemployment, then an inflation bias can arise even if the unemployment target is
the natural rate. Ruge-Murcia (2001) examines empirically this proposition using data from
six developed economies and a specification of preferences whereby the central banker can
attach a larger weight to positive than negative unemployment deviations from the natural
rate. The functional form employed by Ruge-Murcia is attractive because it nests the usual
quadratic loss function as a special case.
This paper constructs a general model with asymmetric preferences and an unemploy-
ment target that is proportional to the natural rate. This model nests as special cases
the Barro-Gordon model and the version of Cukierman’s model examined by Ruge-Murcia
(2001). A linearized, reduced-form version of the model predicts that inflation depends
on expected unemployment (as in the Barro-Gordon model) and the conditional variance
of unemployment. When the unemployment target is the natural rate, the coeﬃcient on
expected unemployment is zero and Cukierman’s model is obtained. When the preference
parameter takes the value corresponding to a quadratic loss function, the coeﬃcient on the
[1]
conditional variance is zero and the Barro-Gordon model is obtained.
The model is estimated using quarterly US data on inflation and unemployment. Likeli-
hood Ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is rejected
by the data but the one imposed by Cukierman’s model is not. These results are robust to
the forecasting model for unemployment and to the sample period employed. Hence, the
behavior of US inflation appears to be better explained by a model where the central banker
has asymmetric unemployment preferences around the expected natural rate, than by the
standard textbook Barro-Gordon model with quadratic preferences and an unemployment
target below the natural rate.
Although the asymmetry preference parameter cannot be identified from the reduced-
form coeﬃcients, results are consistent with the view that the Federal Reserve weights more
heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the natural rate. This result
could explain the finding reported by Dolado et al. (2000) that, measured in terms of changes
to the Federal Funds rate, the Federal Reserve appears to react more strongly to negative
than positive output gaps.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates and solves the game-theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the data, constructs the reduced-form version of the model, and
reports econometric results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Setup
Following the literature, an expectations-augmented Phillips curve relates inflation (πt),
unemployment (ut), and the natural rate of unemployment (u
n
t ) :
ut = u
n
t − λ(πt − πet ) + ηt, (1)
where λ is a strictly positive coeﬃcient, πet is the public’s forecast of inflation at time t con-
structed at time t−1, and ηt is a supply disturbance. The public’s forecasts are constructed
rationally, meaning that:
πet = Et−1πt, (2)
where Et−1 is the expectation conditional on all information available at time t − 1. In
what follows, I denote the public’s information set at time t− 1 by It−1, and assume that it
includes all model parameters and observations of the variables up to and including period
t− 1.
[2]
The natural rate of unemployment evolves over time according to:
∆unt = ψ − (1− δ)unt−1 + θ∆unt−1 + ζt, (3)
where ζt is an innovation. This process includes as special cases the stationary (0 < δ < 1)
and unit root (δ = 1) models of the natural rate employed in earlier literature.1 The
intention here is to adopt a general time series specification for the natural rate and then
examine to what extent results are robust to diﬀerent forecasting models for unt . The process
(3) represents the idea that exogenous changes in technology and labor force demographics,
among others, could aﬀect the labor market and generate movements in the natural rate.
Evidence that the natural rate in the United States has changed over the postwar period is
reported by Weiner (1993), Tootell (1994), and Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997).
The central banker aﬀects the inflation rate through a policy instrument. The instrument
is imperfect in that it cannot determine inflation completely, as in:
πt = it + ²t, (4)
where it is the policy instrument and ²t is a control error. This simple specification relaxes
the usual assumption that the monetary authority chooses directly the rate of inflation after
observing (before the public does) the random shocks. Since there is no private information
in the model, the central banker’s information set coincides with the public’s.2
Define ξt to be the 3× 1 vector that contains the model’s structural shocks at time t. I
assume that ξt is serially uncorrelated, normally distributed with zero mean, and (possibly)
conditionally heteroskedastic:
ξt|It−1 =


ηt
ζt
²t


¯¯¯¯
¯¯ It−1 ∼ N(0,Ωt),
where Ωt is a 3 × 3 positive-definite variance-covariance matrix. The conditional het-
eroskedasticity of ξt relaxes the more restrictive assumption of constant conditional second
moments and captures temporary changes in the volatility of the structural shocks. For
example, Hamilton (1996, figure 2) shows that the net change in nominal oil prices, that
could be assimilated to a supply shock, appears to have been more variable in the 1970s
than in the 1960s or the 1980s.
1The constant term could have been written as ψ(1− δ) in order to rule out a drift when unemployment
is I(1). However, for the estimation of the model, it is desirable to allow a nonzero intercept. Standard
procedures can then be used to test whether this term is significantly diﬀerent from zero.
2As an alternative to (4), one could postulate an aggregate demand relation [for example as in Orphanides
and Wilcox (1996)]. In this case, the model solution is unchanged but the interpretation of the reduced-form
disturbances is slightly diﬀerent.
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The central banker has additively separable preferences over inflation and unemployment.
Preferences are represented by the function:
C(πt, ut) = (1/2)(πt − π∗t )2 + (φ/γ2)(exp(γ(ut − u∗t ))− γ(ut − u∗t )− 1), (5)
where γ 6= 0 and φ > 0 are preference parameters, and π∗t and u∗t are the desired rates
of inflation and unemployment, respectively. The possibly nonzero π∗t could interpreted,
for example, as the one associated with the optimal inflation tax. As in Ireland (1999),
the socially-optimal inflation rate is assumed stable enough to be well approximated by a
constant term (denoted by π∗ below).
The unemployment component in (5) is described by the linex function g(x) = (exp(γx)−
γx − 1)/γ2 [Varian (1974)].3 This function has several important properties. First, it
permits diﬀerent weights for positive and negative unemployment deviations from the target.
Consider the case where γ > 0. For unemployment rates below the target, the linear term
becomes progressively more important as unemployment decreases and, consequently, the
loss rises linearly. For unemployment rates above the target, it is the exponential term that
eventually dominates and the loss associated with a positive deviation rises exponentially.
Hence, positive deviations from the target are weighted more severely than negative ones
in the central banker’s loss function. A possible interpretation of this feature is that it
represents diﬀerent attitudes vis a vis expansions and recessions on the part of the central
banker. Second, it predicts that both the size and sign of a deviation aﬀect the central
banker’s loss. In contrast, under quadratic preferences, the loss is completely determined by
the size of the deviation. Third, it relaxes certainty equivalence and allows a prudence motive
on the part of the central banker. Then, moments of higher order than the mean might play
a role in the formulation of monetary policy. For this loss function, the coeﬃcient of relative
prudence [see Kimball (1990)] is γ(ut−u∗t ), that is directly proportional to the unemployment
deviation from its target and increasing in γ. Fourth, it is analytically tractable and yields
a closed-form solution when shocks are normally distributed (see below). Finally, it nests
the quadratic function commonly used in previous literature as a special case when the
preference parameter γ tends to zero.4 This result is important because it suggests that the
3To my knowledge, this loss function was first employed in monetary policy games by Nobay and Peel
(1998). Zellner (1986), Granger and Pesaran (1996), and Christoﬀersen and Diebold (1997) study this
function in the context of optimal forecasting.
4Formally,
Lim
γ → 0
exp(γx)− γx− 1
γ2 =
Lim
γ → 0
x exp(γx)− x
2γ =
Lim
γ → 0
x2 exp(γx)
2
=
x2
2
.
[4]
hypothesis that the central banker’s preferences are quadratic over unemployment could be
evaluated by testing whether γ is statistically diﬀerent from zero or not.
The rate of unemployment targeted by the central banker is proportional to the expected
natural rate of unemployment:
u∗t = kEt−1u
n
t , 0 < k ≤ 1. (6)
It is important to note that (6) admits two special cases. First, the unemployment target
can be strictly less than the expected natural rate (that is, 0 < k < 1). Persson and
Tabellini (2000) note that this assumption is essential in generating the inflation bias in the
linear-quadratic framework of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
Second, the unemployment target can equal the expected natural rate (that is, k = 1).
Blinder (1998) argues that this can be a good description of the central bankers’ behavior.
2.2 Solution
At time t− 1, the central banker selects the value of the instrument, it, that minimizes her
expected loss function. The minimization is subject to the expectations-augmented Phillips
curve and takes as given the public’s inflation forecast. The first-order necessary condition
of this problem is
Et−1πt − π∗ − (λφ/γ)Et−1(exp(γ(ut − kEt−1unt ))− 1) = 0.
Since the objective function is globally convex, the solution to this equation delivers a unique
minimum. As shown below, the assumption that the structural disturbances are normal
implies that, conditional on the information set, unemployment is also normally distributed.
Then, exp(γ(ut − kEt−1unt )) is distributed log normal. Using the intermediate result
Et−1ut = Et−1u
n
t , (7)
obtained by taking conditional expectations in both sides of (1) and using the assumption
of rational expectations, it is possible to write the mean of this log normal distribution as
exp(γ(1− k)Et−1unt + γ2σ2u,t/2)). The notation σ2u,t is the conditional variance of unemploy-
ment and is derived below in terms of the elements of ξt. Finally, using eq. (4), it is easy to
show that
πt = π∗ + (λφ/γ)(exp(γ(1− k)Et−1unt + γ2σ2u,t/2)− 1) +Aξt, (8)
and
ut = Et−1u
n
t +Bξt, (9)
[5]
where A = (0, 0, 1) and B = (1, 1,−λ). Note that since Et−1unt is included in the public’s
information set at time t− 1 and the linear combination Bξt is normally distributed, then
ut|It−1 ∼ N(Et−1unt ,σ2u,t),
where V ar(ut|It−1) = σ2u,t = BΩtB0, as claimed above.
2.3 Two Special Cases
This model was deliberately designed to include the models by Barro and Gordon (1983),
and Cukierman (2000) as special cases. First, when γ → 0 (with 0 < k < 1), one obtains
the Barro-Gordon model:
πt = π∗ + λφ(1− k)Et−1unt +Aξt. (10)
Since the expected natural rate is strictly positive and λφ(1 − k) > 0, the average rate of
inflation is above the optimum. This systematic diﬀerence between realized and optimal
inflation is the inflation bias. Note that if the central banker targets the expected natural
rate of unemployment, there is no longer an inflation bias and the model cannot explain
suboptimally high rates of inflation as the result of the lack of a commitment technology.
From (10), it is clear that the Barro-Gordon model predicts that inflation is positively and
linearly related to the expected rate of unemployment.
Second, when k = 1, one obtains a model that is close in spirit to the one proposed by
Cukierman (2000):
πt = π∗ + (λφ/γ)(exp(γ2σ2u,t/2)− 1) +Aξt. (11)
In this case there can be an inflation bias even if the central banker targets the natural rate of
unemployment. This result follows from the observation that λφ(exp(γ2σ2u,t/2)−1) is always
positive and γ 6= 0, by assumption. The sign of the bias depends on whether γ ≶ 0. In the
case where γ < 0, there is a deflation bias. In the more plausible case where γ > 0, there is an
inflation bias. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The
intuition of this result is as follows. Recall that when the loss function is quadratic, certainty
equivalence holds. Then, the solution of the model is the same regardless of whether there
is uncertainty or not, and only the first (conditional) moment of unemployment explains
the rate of inflation. On the other hand, with asymmetric unemployment preferences, the
marginal benefit of surprise inflation is not linear in unemployment, but convex when γ > 0.
Thus, an increase in uncertainty raises the expected marginal benefit of surprise inflation.
Equation (11) is not the one derived by Cukierman because he uses a diﬀerent asymmetric
loss function than the one employed here. Cukierman assumes that the loss function is
[6]
quadratic for positive, and zero for negative, unemployment deviations from the expected
natural rate. In equilibrium, the inflation bias is an increasing function of the probability
that unemployment falls above the natural rate. However, the basic insight that there
can be an inflation bias when the central banker targets the natural rate provided that her
preferences are asymmetric is due to Cukierman. This Section simply recasts his model in
terms of a loss function that includes quadratic preferences as a special case. This is very
useful because it means that one can test the Barro-Gordon model against a well defined
alternative.
In both the Barro-Gordon model and the version of Cukierman’s model developed here
there can be an inflation bias that arises from the possible temporal inconsistency of monetary
policy in an environment where commitment is not credible. However, the mechanics by
which the inflation bias arises are diﬀerent. In the former model, the bias is due to the central
banker’s desire to obtain the unattainable: a rate of unemployment below the natural rate.
In the latter model, the bias arises from the interaction of prudence and uncertainty. This
diﬀerence has nontrivial implications in positive and normative terms. In normative terms,
the design of institutions (for example, inflation targets or performance contracts) might
be diﬀerent depending on the underlying origin of the inflation bias. In positive terms,
the following section examines whether either of these models (or both) can account for the
inflation dynamics in the United States.
3 Econometric Analysis
3.1 The Data Set
The empirical analysis is carried out using quarterly, seasonally-adjusted observations of US
inflation and unemployment. The rate of inflation is measured by the percentage change (on
an annual basis) in the GDP deflator. The unemployment rate is measured by the average
rate of civilian unemployment in the three months of the quarter. The raw quarterly GDP
deflator and the monthly unemployment rate were taken from the Web Site of the US Bureau
of Labor Statistics (http://stats.bls.gov). In order to assess the robustness of the results
and to allow their comparison with those reported by Ireland (1999), two sample periods
are considered, namely 1960:1 to 1999:4 and 1970:1 to 1999:4. The sample ends with latest
available observation at the time the data was collected (fall of 2000).
[7]
3.2 The Reduced-Form
The empirical analysis of the game-theoretical developed above is complicated by three
factors. First, the natural unemployment rate cannot be observed directly. This means
that in order to estimate the model using data on inflation and unemployment alone, it
is necessary to construct a reduced-form version of the model.5 Second, the conditional
variance of unemployment cannot be observed directly either. In order to address this
problem, one can construct an estimate of σ2u,t using, for example, a parametric ARCH-type
model. However, since the conditional variance then becomes a generated regressor, one
must consider its eﬀect on the eﬃciency and consistency of the estimates.
Third, it is not possible to recover all structural parameters of the model from the reduced-
form estimates. In particular, the preference parameter γ is not identified.6 However, we will
see below that the sign of the reduced-form coeﬃcient of σ2u,t is informative about the sign of
γ. A simple transformation of the model that confronts directly this problem involves the
linearization of the exponential term in (8) by means of a first-order Taylor series expansion
and the use of (7) to obtain the reduced-form:
πt = a+ bEt−1ut + cσ2u,t + et, (12)
where a is a constant intercept, b = λφ(1 − k) ≥ 0, c = λφγ/2 ≶ 0, and et is a reduced-
form disturbance. Notice that even though an estimate of c does not reveal the values
of λ, φ, and γ, its sign tell us something about the asymmetry in the central banker’s
preferences. Specifically, since λ, φ > 0, a positive estimate of c implies that γ > 0 and is
consistent with the idea that the central banker weights more heavily positive than negative
unemployment deviations from the target. In terms of the two special cases discussed above,
the Barro-Gordon model corresponds to the case where γ → 0 and, consequently, c = 0.
The Cukierman model corresponds to the case where k = 1 and, consequently, b = 0.
A reduced-form for the unemployment process is constructed as follows. Use Et−1u
n
t =
ψ − (1− δ)unt−1 + θ∆unt−1 from (3) and substitute in (9) to obtain:
ut = ψ − (1− δ)unt−1 + θ∆unt−1 + ζt + ηt − λ²t.
5Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997) construct estimates of the natural rate using data on inflation and
unemployment. In the context of this model, it is clear that such estimates provide no additional information
beyond that already contained in πt and ut.
6To see this, rewrite (8) as
πt = (π∗ − λφ/γ) + (λφ/γ)(exp(γ(1− k)Et−1ut + γ2σ2u,t/2) +Aξt.
An estimate of the intercept term would only deliver a combination of the structural parameters, namely
π∗ − λφ/γ, while the time-series variation of σ2u,t and Et−1ut alone would not identify k,λ,φ and γ.
[8]
Adding and substracting ψ+δut−1+θ∆ut−1, noting that unt −ut = λ²t−ηt, and substracting
ut−1 in both sides yield:
∆ut = ψ − (1− δ)unt−1 + θ∆unt−1 + ζt − λ²t + ηt + δ(λ²t−1− ηt−1) + θ(λ∆²t−i−∆ηt−i). (13)
This equation describes unemployment as a function of its past realizations and a linear
combination of current and past structural shocks. An advantage of this representation is
that it does not include the unobserved natural rate as one of the regressors. However, with
only data on inflation and unemployment, it is not possible to disentangle the residuals of
each structural disturbance. This means that one cannot construct empirical counterparts
for the lagged ²t and ηt that enter (13) and, consequently, the unemployment process cannot
be estimated without additional identification restrictions.
The strategy followed here assumes that ζt, ²t and ηt are mutually uncorrelated with
each other at all leads and lags, and exploits time series results on the aggregation of ARMA
processes [see Harvey (1981, p. 43)].7 These results imply that the aggregation of ζt
and the two MA(2) processes in ²t and ηt, yields a MA(2) process with exactly the same
statistical properties as the original sequence. Hence, in the case where the natural rate
of unemployment is assumed to be I(1) (that is, δ = 1), realized unemployment follows an
ARIMA(1,1,2) process. In the case where the natural rate of unemployment is assumed to
be I(0) (that is, δ = 1), realized unemployment follows an ARIMA(2,0,2) process.
Finally, from the assumptions about the structural shocks, it follows that the reduced-
form disturbances are also serially uncorrelated, jointly normally distributed with zero mean,
and possibly conditionally heteroskedastic.
3.3 Econometric Issues
The model predicts that the conditional variance of unemployment helps forecast the in-
flation rate. However, this prediction can only be examined in a time series framework if
unemployment is conditionally heteroskedastic. That is, if σ2u,t changes over time. Other-
wise, if σ2u,t is constant, its coeﬃcient is not be identified. Hence, before proceeding further,
it is important to test whether the conditional variance of unemployment is indeed time-
varying. Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test statistics for neglected ARCH were calculated as
the product of the number of observations and the uncentered R2 of the OLS regression of
7This identification strategy is diﬀerent from that in Ireland (1999). In his case, the Phillips curve has
no supply disturbance. With two structural shocks (ζt and ²t) and two observable variables (πt and ut),
one can recover the lagged ²t in (13). The model also generates additional covariance restrictions that allow
the identification of λ, but not of φ or k. Ireland reports (p. 287) that these restrictions are rejected by US
data.
[9]
the squared unemployment residual on a constant and one to six of its lags. Under the
null hypothesis of no conditional heteroskedasticity, this statistic is distributed chi-square
with as many degrees of freedom as the number of lagged squared residuals included in the
regression. The residuals are the ones obtained from fitting an ARIMA(1,1,2) to the US
unemployment rate and are labeled as “original” in Table 1.8 Since all statistics are above
their 5 percent critical value in all cases, the hypothesis of no conditional heteroskedasticity
can be rejected.
Since σ2u,t is the conditional variance of unemployment as of time t− 1 and et is serially
uncorrelated, then σ2u,t is contemporaneously uncorrelated with et. However, σ2u,t is not di-
rectly observable. Instead, I use a GARCH(1,1) to construct an estimate of the conditional
variance. Because this estimate is constructed using unemployment data, it constitutes a
generated regressor. Pagan (1984) and Pagan and Ullah (1988) study the implications of
generated regressors in estimation and inference. In many cases generated regressors can
be problematic because they measure with noise the true, but unobserved, regressor. In
the specific case where the conditional variance is computed using an ARCH-type model,
the Maximum Likelihood estimator could be biased and inconsistent if the ARCH model is
misspecified. Unfortunately, the instrumental variable estimator proposed by Pagan and
Ullah cannot be employed in this case because the current endogenous variable is a function
of all past history and no instruments are available. Instead, Pagan and Ullah (p. 99)
suggest specification tests to assess whether the chosen ARCH model is valid. A standard
misspecification test for ARCH models is the LM test for neglected ARCH described above,
but applied to the standardized squared residuals. If the ARCH model is correctly specified,
then the residuals corrected for heteroskedasticity and squared should be serially uncorre-
lated. These residuals are label as “standardized” in Table 1. Since all statistics are below
their 5 percent critical value in all cases, the hypothesis of no conditional heteroskedasticity
cannot be rejected. Hence, it would appear that the parsimonious GARCH(1,1) model
employed here adequately captures the conditional heteroskedasticity in US unemployment.
ARCH models parameterize the conditional variance of a series as a function of lagged
squared residuals. In terms of the game-theoretical model here, this means σ2u,t is a paramet-
ric function of lagged squared unemployment. Then, the comparison between the Barro-
Gordon model and the version of Cukierman’s model can be cast in the following terms.
Under the Barro-Gordon model, lagged unemployment (that enters linearly into Et−1ut) is
helpful in forecasting inflation linearly. Under the version of Cukierman’s model, lagged
unemployment (that enters squared into σ2u,t) is helpful in forecasting inflation nonlinearly.
8Results obtained using an ARIMA(2,0,2) are very similar to the ones reported and are available from
the author upon request.
[10]
Hence, the comparison between both models is essentially the comparison between a linear
and nonlinear model of the relation between inflation and (past) unemployment.
3.4 Estimation and Results
The joint process of inflation and unemployment was estimated by the numerical maximiza-
tion of their joint log likelihood function. The system consists of the inflation equation (12)
and either an ARIMA(2,0,2) or an ARIMA(1,1,2) for unemployment depending on whether
one assumes that the natural rate is stationary or not. As noted above, the intention is to
examine to what extent results are robust to the use of diﬀerent forecasting models for the
unemployment rate. Tables 2 and 3 report Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML)
estimates of the reduced-form coeﬃcients in (12) for the samples 1960:1 to 1999:4 and 1970:1
to 1999:4, respectively.9 Panels A and B in each Table report results for the cases where
unemployment is forecasted using an ARIMA(2,0,2) or an ARIMA(1,1,2), respectively.
Column (2) reports the estimates of the most general model with asymmetric central bank
preferences and an unemployment target proportional to the natural rate (that is, 0 < k ≤ 1).
This model imposes restrictions neither on preferences, nor on the proportion of the natural
rate that is targeted by the central bank. The coeﬃcient of expected unemployment (b) is
quantitatively small and some cases negative. In all cases, the hypothesis that this coeﬃcient
is zero cannot be rejected at standard significance levels. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient
of the conditional variance of unemployment (c) is always positive and the hypothesis that its
true value is zero can be rejected at the 5 percent level in three cases and at the 10 percent
level in one case. Hence, it would appear that conditional variance of unemployment is
statistically more important than its level in explaining US inflation.
Estimates of the Barro-Gordon model are reported in Column (1) of Tables 2 and 3.
This model arises from imposing the restriction that γ → 0 in the general asymmetric
model. Then, the central banker’s preferences are quadratic and the conditional variance
of unemployment should have not explanatory power over the inflation rate. In terms
of the reduced-form model, this restriction implies c = 0. Notice that in all cases the
unemployment coeﬃcient is positive, as predicted by the theory, and (except in one case)
statistically diﬀerent from zero. These results are very similar to the ones reported by Ireland
(1999) and confirm his findings using a diﬀerent estimation and identification strategy.
Since the Barro-Gordon and general asymmetric models are nested, it is possible to
compare them using a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of the null hypothesis that c = 0. Under
9Estimates of the unemployment process are not reported to save space, but they are available from the
author upon request.
[11]
the null, the LR statistic is distributed chi-square with one degree of freedom. The statistic is
reported in Tables 2 and 3 for both samples and unemployment forecasting models. Because
the statistics are above the 5 percent critical value of 3.841 in all cases, the restriction
imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is rejected in favor of the general model with asymmetric
preferences.
Consider now a restricted version of the asymmetric-preference model where the central
banker targets the natural rate of unemployment (that is, k = 1). This model implies that
c 6= 0 and b = 0, meaning that lagged unemployment is not helpful in predicting inflation
linearly. These estimates are reported in Column (3) of Tables 2 and 3. The coeﬃcient
on the conditional variance of unemployment is positive and statistically diﬀerent from zero
at the 5 percent level in all cases. A LR test of the restriction that b = 0 yields statistics
that are well below the 5 percent critical value of a chi-square variable with one degree of
freedom. Hence, the restriction that the central banker targets the natural rate cannot be
rejected in favor the model with a below-natural unemployment target.
Recall that the reduced-form coeﬃcients b = λφ(1−k) and c = λφγ/2, and the structural
parameters λ,φ > 0, by assumption. The finding that bˆ is approximately zero is consistent
with Blinder’s observation [see Blinder (1998, p. 43)] that central banks actually target the
expected natural rate of unemployment (that is, k ' 1). The finding that cˆ is positive implies
that the preference parameter γ is larger than zero, meaning that the US Federal Reserve
weights more heavily positive than negative unemployment deviations from the natural rate.
This result could account for the finding by Dolado et al. (2000) that the Fed tends to react
more strongly, in terms of changes to the Federal Funds rate, to negative than positive output
gaps. The prudence motive that arises when one relaxes quadratic preferences, means that
the conditional variance of unemployment is helpful in forecasting the US inflation rate.
In summary, when comparing statistically the general asymmetric model with its two
special cases, results indicate that the restriction imposed by the Barro-Gordon model is
rejected by the data, while the one imposed by the version of Cukierman’s model is not.
Hence, US inflation is better explained by a game-theoretical model where the central banker
weights more severely positive than negative unemployment deviations from the expected
natural rate than by the standard textbook Barro-Gordon model where the central banker
has quadratic preferences and targets a rate of unemployment below the natural rate.
4 Discussion
The seminal papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) gave rise
to a large theoretical literature that examines the normative and positive implications of the
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temporal inconsistency of monetary policy. In contrast, the empirical analysis of this type of
game-theoretical models has been more limited. This paper tests the predictions of the basic
Barro-Gordon model by constructing a well-defined alternative that relaxes assumptions
about central bank preferences and the targeted proportion of the natural unemployment
rate. In particular, the central banker is allowed to weight more, or less, severely positive
than negative unemployment deviations from its target. Hence, in contrast to the quadratic
loss function usually employed in the literature, both the sign and magnitude of a deviation
can aﬀect the central banker’s loss. The general model nests the Barro-Gordon as a special
case where the asymmetry preference parameter tends to zero. It also nests a version of the
model proposed by Cukierman (2000) when the central banker targets the expected natural
rate.
The model is estimated by FIML using quarterly US data on inflation and unemployment.
Likelihood Ratio tests indicate that the restriction imposed by the Barro-Gordon model
is rejected by the data but the one imposed by Cukierman’s model is not. Estimates
of the reduced-form coeﬃcients are consistent with idea that the Fed targets the natural
unemployment rate [as suggested by Blinder (1998)] and that it weights more heavily positive
than negative unemployment deviations from its target.
Although the results reported in this paper are suggestive, they should be interpreted
with caution for at least three reasons. First, the model does not allow for the long lags that
monetary policy seems to take to aﬀect inflation and output. Second, the model assumes
that the central bank’s preference parameters are constant throughout the sample period.
However, given the changes in the composition of the Board (including its chairman) during
this period, it is likely that the degree of asymmetry in preferences, the unemployment target,
and/or the unemployment weight in the loss function, might have changed over the sample.
For example, Cukierman (2000) argues that a possible interpretation of the US inflation
rate is that during the 1970s the unemployment target was below the natural rate, while in
subsequent years it was close to or at the natural rate. Third, this paper focuses on the Nash
equilibrium, but other equilibrium concepts might be empirically important. For example,
it seems likely that reputation plays an important role in the formulation of US monetary
policy. Current and future research by the author seeks to address these observations. Still,
given our limited understanding of central bankers’ behavior and preferences, it is probably
premature to dismiss the idea that departures from the usual linear-quadratic setup are
quantitatively important in modern US monetary policy making.
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Table 1. LR Tests for Neglected ARCH
Squared # of Lags
Residuals Sample Period 1 2 3 4 5 6
Original 1960:1 to 1999:4 9.57∗ 15.47∗ 15.56∗ 16.67∗ 16.67∗ 17.05∗
1970:1 to 1999:4 7.45∗ 14.39∗ 14.58∗ 14.99∗ 15.19∗ 15.23∗
Standardized 1960:1 to 1999:4 0.16 0.95 0.99 1.09 1.20 1.54
1970:1 to 1999:4 0.23 0.42 0.44 1.58 1.99 6.83
Notes: The superscripts ∗ and † denote the rejection of the null hypothesis of conditional
homoskedasticity at the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 2. FIML Estimates
Sample 1960:1 to 1999:4
Model
Barro-Gordon Asymmetric with Asymmetric with
Coeﬃcient 0 < k ≤ 1 k = 1
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Forecasting Unemployment using ARIMA(2,0,2)
a 2.27∗ 3.23∗ 3.26∗
(0.80) (0.65) (0.29)
b 0.27∗ 0.005
(0.13) (0.11)
c 7.69∗ 7.76∗
(3.33) (2.98)
Log likelihood −61.91 −59.17 −59.17
LR statistic (H : c = 0) 5.48
LR statistic (H : b = 0) 0.001
Panel B. Forecasting Unemployment using ARIMA(1,1,2)
a 2.01∗ 3.04∗ 3.08∗
(0.78) (0.72) (0.35)
b 0.31∗ 0.008
(0.13) (0.15)
c 10.07† 10.25∗
(5.76) (4.70)
Log likelihood −66.78 −63.37 −63.37
LR statistic (H : c = 0) 6.82
LR statistic (H : b = 0) 0.0018
Notes: a is the intercept term, b is the coeﬃcient of expected unemployment, and c is the
coeﬃcient of the conditional variance of unemployment. The figures in parenthesis are
standard errors. The superscripts ∗ and † denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that
the true coeﬃcient is zero at the 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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Table 3. FIML Estimates
Sample 1970:1 to 1999:4
Model
Barro-Gordon Asymmetric with Asymmetric with
Coeﬃcient 0 < k ≤ 1 k = 1
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A. Forecasting Unemployment using ARIMA(2,0,2)
a 2.66∗ 4.78∗ 3.49∗
(1.07) (1.24) (0.33)
b 0.26 −0.24
(0.16) (0.23)
c 13.42∗ 10.06∗
(5.15) (3.32)
Log likelihood −53.64 −47.16 −47.75
LR statistic (H : c = 0) 6.48
LR statistic (H : b = 0) 1.80
Panel B. Forecasting Unemployment using ARIMA(1,1,2)
a 2.07∗ 3.24∗ 2.86∗
(1.05) (1.11) (0.59)
b 0.36∗ −0.08
(0.16) (0.20)
c 22.27∗ 20.14∗
(10.89) (8.65)
Log likelihood −62.20 −56.14 −56.22
LR statistic (H : c = 0) 6.06
LR statistic (H : b = 0) 0.16
Notes: see notes to Table 2.
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